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Abstract
In this paper we identify speciﬁc security requirements for distributed workﬂows and provide a decentralized
workﬂow execution mechanism that ensures their satisfaction. With our composition concept we ensure that
each web service can access only the information which is needed for the correct execution of the invoked
operations and we provide an execution proof of the fulﬁlled assignments. Our approach relies on a data
structure, called process slip, which is passed among the web services participating in the composition.
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1 Introduction
A Workﬂow Management Systems (WFMS) is often used to support the automated
execution of business processes. Nowadays the World Wide Web provides new
opportunities of performing such business processes, namely by deploying diﬀerent
web services. A standard for specifying such workﬂow processes is the Web Services
Business Process Execution Language (WSBPEL) [2], or BPEL in short. A web
service workﬂow can be deﬁned as a set of interacting web services or a web service
composition, in which it is determined which web services participate in the process,
the order of their interactions and which data is transferred during the process. Web
service compositions are used to automate the coordination between participating
“partners” thereby increasing the eﬃciency of the whole process. There exist two
diﬀerent types of interaction between the single web services in a workﬂow:
• service orchestration (centralized) refers to those workﬂows, in which there exists
one central service that receives the client requests, makes the required data
transformations and invokes the component web services.
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• service choreography (decentralized) refers to the workﬂows in which there are
multiple engines, each executing a composite web service speciﬁcation (a small
part of the original composite web service speciﬁcation but complete in itself) at
distributed locations. The engines communicate directly with each other (rather
than through a central coordinator) to transfer data and control when necessary
in an asynchronous manner.
In the centralized system model one or more workﬂow engines, where each of them
is able to interpret the process deﬁnition, interact with workﬂow participants and,
where required, invoke the use of IT tools and applications. On one hand central-
ized systems provide centralized monitoring and auditing, simpler synchronization
mechanisms and overall design simplicity. But on the other hand, as stated in [26],
the centralized approach of web service compositions suﬀers from some drawbacks.
Centralized service architectures are designed as classical client/server applications
in which the server provides most of the functionality of the system while the compu-
tational potential at the client side is barely used. This can result in ineﬃcient sys-
tems when many parallel instances need to be executed. Systems with client/server
architecture are normally vulnerable to server failures. They have diﬃculties with
system conﬁguration and actions requiring modiﬁcation and update of the central-
ized server, which is very inconvenient and ineﬃcient. From a security perspective
a central server introduces a single point of failure where a number of diﬀerent part-
ners share one system which is under the control of one single partner. In addition
to these availability issues this leads to organizational implications related to the
trustworthiness of the overall concept.
In contrast to the centralized approach, in a decentralized workﬂow each partner
can be aware of the actual state of the workﬂow and its involvement in the workﬂow.
The decentralized WFMS should be able to distribute the tasks to the appropri-
ate partners, and ensure speciﬁed task dependencies by sending the tasks to the
predetermined partners only when all prerequisite conditions are satisﬁed. How-
ever, decentralized execution of inter-organizational workﬂows may raise a number
of security issues including integrity, non-repudiation and conﬁdentiality.
In this paper we provide a decentralized workﬂow execution mechanism that
ensures the correctness of the control ﬂow and the satisfaction of main security
requirements. With our composition approach we ensure that each web service can
access only the information which is needed for the correct execution of the invoked
operations and we provide an execution proof of the fulﬁlled assignments. At the
end of the workﬂow the integrity and the authenticity of the provided execution
proof can be veriﬁed by a central veriﬁcation unit. The main idea of our approach
is that the communication and data transfer between the web services participating
in the composition is based on a particular data structure, called process slip.
In the following sections we present our concept of the process slip. Section 2
presents the technological foundation and brieﬂy discusses related concepts. The
concept of distributed workﬂows and their speciﬁc security issues are explored in
Section 3. The structure of our container is presented in Section 4. In Section 5
we describe the integration of the process slip in a decentralized workﬂow and show
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how the security properties, given in Section 3, are realized by the integration of our
container. This section also contains a brief description of the concept of a security
stub and explains in details our workﬂow execution mechanism. In the conclusion
we discuss planned further research in this area.
2 Related Work
Related work in the ﬁeld of process security for distributed workﬂows is scarce. On
the level of document security the TransiDoc Project [22] Piechalski and Schmidt
proposed a scheme to extend the concept of transformations of paper documents
to their digital counterparts. Thus, each change to a document (e.g. a translation)
can be digitally signed and non-repudiation of processes is achieved.
Web services based on WSDL, SOAP, and UDDI are developed to a standard
in the communication from machine to machine [1]. The WS-* family of protocols
cover a variety of middleware related topics like messaging [16], transactions [11,10],
and security [17]. Best practice patterns and tools for the application of security and
trust mechanisms already exist for these protocols [24]. In complex environments
process deﬁnition languages like BPEL [2] are used in combination with additional
concepts as deﬁned for example by the Enterprise Service Bus [4]. This allows for
ﬂexible solutions with respect to integration of new services and changes in the
processes supported by the system design.
Workﬂows deﬁned by BPEL are abstractions of business processes and have
inherent security requirements with respect to their order of execution and the data
they contain. Vagts [25] proposes a decentralized framework for workﬂow execution
that ensures exception safety and considers security issues. Secure execution orders
are also considered by Biskup et al. [3] supporting the case of a decentralized system
by proposing a container structure with authentication mechanisms for data access.
A similar approach is shown by Charﬁ and Mezini [5]. They introduce a framework
for providing middleware support in BPEL engines based on a process container,
which intercepts the execution of BPEL processes and calls dedicated middleware
services to add support for security, persistence and reliable messaging. This is done
by using an aspect oriented approach similar to AspectJ [9].
In scenarios with central authority of a dedicated workﬂow management system
existing WS-* protocols can oﬀer a certain level of security on the link level. Bilal
et al. [12] show how to describe non-repudiation protocols in BPEL. In particular,
they propose and verify non-repudiation protocol using Petri Nets for chain-linked
business transactions and show that they may be speciﬁed in BPEL.
Besides the technological basis for the provisioning of security features the deﬁ-
nition of security requirements and policy deﬁnition for each BPEL workﬂow has to
be considered. Work exists in the automated creation of BPEL from choreography
languages like WS-CDL [13] or UMM [8]. However, existing choreography languages
are missing features to deﬁne non-repudiation or complex end to end conﬁdential-
ity. Nevertheless, high level deﬁnition languages are a promising approach to create
consisting security policies for workﬂow deﬁnitions.
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3 Security Issues and Distributed Workﬂows
A wide variety of security requirements can occur for workﬂows and even more for
distributed workﬂows. Usually these requirements are either identiﬁed based on
static trust relations on the organizational or IT infrastructure level, or for single
services within the workﬂow. However, in particular in the case of decentralized
workﬂows it is not trivial to derive the correct combination of security mechanisms
that satisﬁes all requirements of the diﬀerent partners involved in the workﬂow.
Therefore, it is necessary to precisely deﬁne security requirements on the level of
the workﬂow itself. A full formal framework for the speciﬁcation of security re-
quirements for workﬂows is out of the scope of this paper, but we can refer to the
generic framework for security requirements by Gu¨rgens et al. [7] which is used in
the EU FP7 project SERENITY 4 for the formal speciﬁcation of workﬂow security
requirements in the context of security services.
Workﬂow security requirements can be, for example, concerned with the authen-
ticity of an entity performing a particular service in a workﬂow, integrity or conﬁ-
dentiality of data that is transported between entities involved in the workﬂow, or
the enforcement of particular (distributed) sequences of actions (or services) in the
workﬂow. A combination of security mechanisms for single services as well as for
the overall workﬂow can be required to satisfy all these diﬀerent security properties.
The main contribution of this paper is one particular security mechanism, namely
the electronic process slip for decentralized workﬂows. In such a workﬂow, diﬀerent
partners can be service providers but also take control for parts of the workﬂow.
There is no clear distinction between client, service provider and workﬂow engine.
This situation increases the complexity of security requirements. In the following
paragraphs the discussion of security requirements for distributed workﬂows con-
centrates on those requirements that can be satisﬁed by electronic process slips. We
distinguish four classes of properties: authenticity, non-repudiation, conﬁdentiality
and enforcement of workﬂow sequences.
Authenticity
In general, authenticity of a particular action is satisﬁed for one partner P in a
workﬂow if P can deduce that this action has occurred from its knowledge about the
global behaviour of the workﬂow system (including all partners and also including
possible malicious behaviour) and the view of the current behaviour that the action
has occurred. Stronger authenticity requirements can restrict the occurrence of the
action to be authentic to the current instance of the workﬂow or even to a particular
phase of the current instance of the workﬂow. In a centrally controlled workﬂow,
a workﬂow engine or in service-oriented architectures an enterprise service bus are
in a position to control the workﬂow and reliably log and report all actions in the
workﬂow. Furthermore, central control also obviously allows a workﬂow engine to
enforce particular sequences or workﬂow behaviour. Thus, in centralized workﬂows
authenticity can usually be reduced to authenticity of single service executions. In
4 http://www.serenity-project.org/
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distributed decentralized workﬂows all players need to contribute to the control and
enforcement of authenticity.
Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation is strongly related to authenticity but in addition requires that
one partner can prove to other partners that a particular action or sequence of
actions has occurred. Thus, the partner executing those action cannot repudiate
this execution. Again, a trusted central entity could simply collect evidence (e.g.
digital signatures) and in case of dispute provide this evidence for dispute resolution.
In a decentralized workﬂows partner have to collect evidence and might even have
to rely on other partners for the enforcement of non-repudiation requirements. If
security is based on such a mutual trust between partners in a distributed workﬂow,
overall trust requirements have to be considered in the design of the workﬂow and
the security policies.
Conﬁdentiality
A large variety of information can be required to be conﬁdential in a workﬂow.
This information can include data transferred or computed within the workﬂow,
identity information of the partners involved, order of execution of workﬂow ac-
tions, parts of the workﬂow speciﬁcation, security policies, cryptographic keys, and
audit trails or evidence collected for non-repudiation. The electronic process slip
introduced in Section 4 can provide security mechanisms for a large part of this
variety of requirements. It can also be used as a basis to reason about the require-
ments in order to ﬁnd conﬂicting requirements or contradictions. Formalization of
conﬁdentiality is often based on non-interference and information ﬂow properties for-
malizing the requirement that the occurrence of some actions cannot interfere with
the behaviour of those partners not allowed to gain knowledge about these actions.
Non-interference properties can be used to formalize conﬁdentiality of workﬂow data
towards external attackers. However, non-interference properties are not suitable
for properties within a workﬂow where a partner might know about the occurrence
of some or all workﬂow actions but might not be allowed to know the values of
all parameters in the workﬂow data. The notion of parameter conﬁdentiality [6] is
more suitable to formalise conﬁdentiality requirements for workﬂows.
Enforcement of sequences
Security of a workﬂow very often depends on the order of actions in the workﬂow.
A particular action can depend on a number of other actions occurred before or a
particular binding phase can only be ﬁnished if all goals of the involved partners are
satisﬁed. Again, a trusted central entity can enforce these properties and reduce
these rather complex requirements to requirements for single actions or services
within the workﬂow. It should be noted that this reduction is not always as easy
as in the case of authenticity of particular actions. It might require a combination
of mechanisms for conﬁdentiality, authenticity and non-repudiation.
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The lack of central control in distributed workﬂows increases the complexity of
the problem. It might be even impossible to achieve the most eﬃcient decentraliza-
tion if control has to be given to an untrusted entity and if it is necessary to actually
prevent a deviation from the workﬂow speciﬁcation. Additional communication be-
tween partners might be required to release conﬁdential data that is necessary to
continue with the workﬂow. A realization is easier if it is satisfactory to detect
violations of the requirement after they have occurred. Many of these diﬀerent
combinations of security requirements can be realized by the electronic process slip
introduced in the following section.
4 A Process Slip
Traditional paper based workﬂows use signed reports carrying the relevant infor-
mation. These reports are produced wherever it is required to grant the owner the
access to certain services. This token based concept can also be applied to digital
business processes by establishing a trustworthy data structure as a technical basis
for the workﬂow.
By removing a central authority it is required to distribute the control of the
workﬂow among the managers which are involved into the single (sub)workﬂows.
Additionally we deﬁne a control token traveling from manager to manager, which
is a digital form of a report description of the execution of a workﬂow process.
It transfers all kinds of data between the single managers and stores their digital
signatures as proofs for the executed tasks. Moreover, the webservice workﬂow uses
the process slip to provide the necessary security beneﬁts to these execution records
such as restricted access, integrity and non-repudiation in order to prevent further
unauthorized access of any kind. The process slip must be generated prior to the
initiation of each instance of the workﬂow. This must be done either by the initiator
of the workﬂow or by a service invoked by the initiator.
Our process slip structure contains four subcontainers (see Figure 1): Data,
Audit Data, Security Policies and Workﬂow Description.
Fig. 1. Data components of a process slip
• Data - This subcontainer stores the input data transferred between the consec-
utive steps of the process. Therefore, these data are completely variable from
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step to step. Additional security may be introduced by adding encryption and
integrity means to achieve minimal need to know and preserve integrity. This
leads to a structured container format supporting addressing of the data to cer-
tain steps resp. participants of the workﬂow. According to the needed security
level some (or all) data can be encrypted and signed for the corresponding re-
cipient to ensure conﬁdentiality and integrity of the data. Access control to the
encrypted data is regulated by using tickets, a Public Key infrastructure (PKI),
identity management systems, or pre-shared keys for example. As an alternative
to embed the data into the subcontainer it is also possible to include a redirection
to an alternative source providing the data. This could be implemented by using
a ticket scheme. Access control in this case can also be restricted using a method
as presented above.
• Audit Data - In the audit trail data subcontainer each involved manager should
write according to the workﬂow or security deﬁnition log data for the recently
performed tasks. Each service is only allowed to add process information and
documentation data relevant for the service’s assignments and their output. In
particular, a web service partner stores in the audit subcontainer for each fulﬁlled
task the following information:
· requestPartner, specifying the URL of the service from which the request was
received,
· requestOperation, giving the request operation to be invoked,
· requestAssignment, storing the label(s) of the fulﬁlled assignments.
These documentation data is encrypted for special recipients such as a central
veriﬁcation unit or partner services which according to the underlying security
policies have as requirement for their task the currently fulﬁlled assignment. Ad-
ditionally each report entry in this section must be signed by its author to guar-
antee the integrity of the written information. By adding an authenticated log of
each step to the ﬁnal result it is later on possible to track down the process and
assign responsibility. This provides non-repudiation to the audit data entries.
• Security Policy - Security policies are situated in a separate data structure
which is logically linked to the workﬂow deﬁnition. They specify security bound-
aries for each step or sequence of steps in the workﬂow such as the permitted
activities that a given partner can apply on a speciﬁed data and the execution
order of the assignments in the workﬂow. Each manager has to be able to inter-
pret and enforce these policies accordingly as there is no central authority which
grants for it. To ensure that each service will have access only to the policy
rules needed to execute the assigned tasks and ﬁll in the information, needed
for the next partners, the initiator could encrypt the rules for the corresponding
authorized service. By encrypting the rules each partner service is limited in his
knowledge to the absolute minimum of knowledge regarding the workﬂow he is
working in. Additional data structures are required to support the creation of
audit data in this case.
• Workﬂow Description - The whole process is controlled by a workﬂow de-
scription in the container. This static data structure is not changed during the
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execution of the workﬂow and can either be a full description of the workﬂow or
a reference to a location where the deﬁnition is kept. According to the needed
security level the partner services may have only access to the description of their
own activities. This implies that during the generation of the container some (or
all) parts of the workﬂow description must be encrypted for the corresponding
services, so that they are able to invoke the corresponding actions but do not have
access to the activities of the other partners. Thus authentication and integrity
may be added by XML Signature, XML Security, or WS-Security. In case of a
reference it should be noted that the integrity means are created nonetheless. If
the reference is changed or not available the workﬂow has to perform a roll back.
Whenever a web service participating in the composition receives a process slip
container it performs the following tasks:
(i) ﬁrst, it veriﬁes that the sender is an authorized partner;
(ii) second, it extracts from the slip the audit data of the sender and its security
policy in order to check whether all requirements for its current assignments
are met;
(iii) it decrypts the needed input data if there exists such in the Data subcontainer
of the slip;
(iv) it invokes the corresponding operations and fulﬁlls his assignments;
(v) when all operations are terminated, it modiﬁes correspondingly the received
process slip;
(vi) ﬁnally, it sends the modiﬁed slip container to partner(s) associated with the
next control structure(s).
5 Realization of Global Workﬂow Security Policies
In this section we will describe the integration of the process slip container in a
decentralized workﬂow and the realization of the described security properties by
the integration of our container. First in 5.1 we will specify the notation used to
present the structure and the functionality of our workﬂow execution concept. In
subsection 5.2 we brieﬂy explain the concept of a security stub utilized to handle
the process slip container. In the last subsection we give a detailed description of
the proposed workﬂow execution.
5.1 Workﬂow Model
A workﬂow is deﬁned as the automation of a business process, during which docu-
ments, information or tasks are passed from one participant to another, according
to a set of procedural rules [18]. It can be represented as partially ordered set of
interrelated assignments (A) that lead to accomplishing a speciﬁc predeﬁned goal.
The order of the assignment execution can be managed by specifying interdepen-
dencies between the input and output event or data of each assignment. In this
way we can achieve chains of activities which specify the exact order of the diﬀerent
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assignments in the scope of the corresponding workﬂow. Each partner, engaged in
the process, is assigned to a particular subset of assignments.
In order to be able to give an abstract representation of a distributed workﬂow
we ﬁrst introduce the following entities. Let:
• P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} be the set of the partners, engaged in the workﬂow.
• D = {d1, d2, . . . , ds} be the data set shared by the partners of a workﬂow.
• A = {a1, a2, . . . , am} = {(in1, out1), (in2, out2), . . . , (inm, outm)} be a set of as-
signments, where each assignment is speciﬁed by its input and output data
(A ⊆ D ×D).
• ACT = {act1, act2, . . . , actk} be a set of k activities which deﬁne the possible
data access privileges.
• POL = {pol1, pol2, . . . , poll} be a set of l security policies.
Furthermore, we specify the following relations between these entities, which actu-
ally deﬁne the content of the secure policies:
• assign : P → Ak = {a1, a2, . . . , ap} ⊂ A speciﬁes the assigned tasks to a partner
pk;
• access : P ×D → {ACT}i=1,...,i which gives the permitted activities that a given
partner can perform on a given data;
One possibility to ensure that our framework fulﬁlls the corresponding security
properties (see Section 3) is to use a PKI, which involves generation of public and
private keys and public key certiﬁcates for each service, deployed during the work-
ﬂow. Since the process of key and certiﬁcate generation and distribution is out of
the scope of this work we assume the existence of a trusted CA, that can generate
keys and certiﬁcates for the workﬂow participants and the existence of a service,
responsible for their secure distribution among the partners. If new parties partici-
pate in interactions during the handling process, we assume that their key pairs and
certiﬁcates are also correspondingly generated and distributed. Therefore we can
assume that prior to the execution of a workﬂow each participant pi receives a pub-
lic/private key pair
(
ppubi , p
priv
i
)
for asymmetric encryption and digital signatures
and a public key certiﬁcate, digitally signed by the corresponding CA. For simplicity
we assume that the same keypair is used for encryption and digital signatures. For
practical realizations one would distinguish signature and encryption keys.
We denote with W the abstract representation of a distributed workﬂow deﬁned
by
W =
{
iidW , (pi)i∈[1,n], (Ai)i∈[1,n], C
}
,
where iidW is a unique string, identifying an instance of the workﬂow, pi is a partner
web service, Ai is the set of its assignments in the workﬂow and C is the set of the
inter dependencies between the separate assignments.
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5.2 The Security Stub
The structure of the process slip container (see Section 4) is not a standard one
and to require that each partner service, deployed in the composition, implements
extra functions to parse and use it, is a very strong requirement. Therefore, in order
to assure that each web service, deployed in the workﬂow, will be able to handle
the process slip container properly and to use its functionality, we apply a generic
approach by deﬁning a Security Stub (see Figure 2). This stub wraps around the
core functionality of the web service and provides all the extra functions needed to
handle our process slip. The main task of the Security Stub is to parse the audit
and security data, to extract and enforce the corresponding security policies. During
this process it is also required that the stub veriﬁes all relevant security means to
testify the integrity, authenticity and authorization properly. If all these tasks are
performed successfully the core service is invoked and with the results of the service
invocation a new process slip audit and data block are created according to the
security and workﬂow policies.
Fig. 2. Security stub
5.3 Workﬂow Execution
In this section we will describe the main steps involved in our custom workﬂow
execution. As we already outlined, the generation and the distribution of the pub-
lic/private key pairs and the identity certiﬁcates of the partners is not a matter of
this work. Therefore we assume that there exists a trusted CA and the keys and the
certiﬁcates have been generated and securely distributed among all possible part-
ners. We also assume that the workﬂow deﬁnition already exists and the partners
which are supposed to participate in the workﬂow execution are ﬁxed 5 .
The ﬁrst step is the initialization of the process slip components. This is per-
formed by the initiator of the workﬂow p1. We can split this process in the following
steps:
5 If the partners are not ﬁxed the initiator of the workﬂow must perform a service location procedure (e.g.
UDDI search) during the workﬂow initiation phase.
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• Generating the Security Policies The security policies must correspond the
security requirements of the diﬀerent tasks and the workﬂow deﬁnition. They
must also authorize all activities, which the partners should be able to perform
on the diﬀerent sections of the process slip (e.g. some services may be granted
a read or write access to the Audit Data section but no one can be allowed to
delete anything from this section). To prevent an unauthorized access to the
service’s policies the initiator may encrypt each policy with the public key of the
corresponding service.
• Initialization of the Data and the Audit Data Sections: Since the workﬂow
is still in initialization phase, there exists no actual and audit data to be shared
among the partner services. Therefore the Data and the Audit Data sections are
only initialized.
Once the initialization phase is complete, the workﬂow execution proceeds with
the delegation of the execution to the service responsible for the ﬁrst set of tasks.
Let assume that we are in the i-th step of the workﬂow execution, where the next
set of tasks Ai = assign(pi) must be performed by pi and pi−1 has just ﬁnished its
assigned tasks Ai−1 and has sent the process slip to pi. Then the workﬂow execution
follows with the following scenario:
(i) The security stub of pi extracts the policy poli from the Security Policies section
of the slip.
(ii) After that the data {di}i∈[1,t], located in the Data section of the container and
encrypted for pi, is decrypted and the core web service of pi is invoked.
(iii) After pi has completed the assigned tasks Ai the security stub of pi ﬁlls in
the Audit Data section, according to the speciﬁed rules in poli. It must ﬁrst
encrypt the task report entries for the central veriﬁcation unit. Then the
security stub of pi must sign the Audit Data section by inserting a digital
signature of the Audit Data section. The signature is on a message digest
of the whole content of the section and on a time stamp, which is proving
creation time of the signature. If there exists output data Di = {di}i∈[1,k] of
the currently completed tasks which must be conﬁdential for a partner pj , then
it encrypts the corresponding data with ppubj and inserts the data and a digital
signature (on the inserted data and on a time stamp, proving the time of the
insertion) in the Data section.
(iv) Once all previous activities have been completed the process slip is sent to the
next service partner, which continues the execution of the workﬂow.
If in the workﬂow there exist service partners which cannot be trusted or which
join the workﬂow for the ﬁrst time then they must authenticate themselves in front
of the initiator or to each service with which they communicate. In order to do
this they send their public key certiﬁcate to the service they want to communicate
with. In order to verify that a received certiﬁcate is not revoked the security stub
relies on some communication with external security services. These are Public Key
Infrastructure services which are used to verify certiﬁcate validity by querying the
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certiﬁcate authority using the Online Certiﬁcate Status Protocol (OCSP) [15]. In
order to provide this functionality we introduce in our workﬂow model the Trusted
Third Party (TTP) service, which implements the functionality of the verifying CA.
Therefore, once the request from such a partner pi−1 is received the security stub of
the receiver pi ﬁrst sends to the TTP an OCSP request that contains a ﬁngerprint
of pi−1’s public key. Then the TTP sends a signed OCSP response back to pi and
pi veriﬁes the TTP’s response (each partner in the process has access to the TTP’s
public key and TTP is a trusted service) and ensures that the request has come
from an authorized partner.
(a) Sequence process slip
composition
(b) Process slip composition with parallel workﬂows
Fig. 3. Composition of the process slip
During the process execution there exist two basic variants of execution scenarios
for the composition of the process slip. The basic variant is serial execution. In this
case every service works on the results of the previous service. Each service inserts
its own entries in the Audit Data section and signs the whole section. Figure 3(a)
describes this approach. It depicts the sequence composition of a process slip,
where the services A, B and C insert their entries one after another. In this way
the resulting structure of signatures resembles an onion structure [14] with several
layers.
Figure 3(b) illustrates the second case of parallel workﬂows. In this case at a
certain point in time the workﬂow forks and has to be merged at a later step. In
this case the “join” service (depicted by service D in Figure 3(b)), which is in charge
for the merge, receives all results from the sub-workﬂows and creates one signature
around the whole data package. It is to be noted that in case of parallel workﬂow
branches the “join” service should wait for the input process slips of all parallel
branches so that no information is lost during the merging process. Therefore, here
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it is important to establish an adequate workﬂow control to ensure that all sub-
workﬂows meet again in one service to be merged. More detailed information about
methods for merging business processes can be found in [23] .
6 Conclusion
Distribution of workﬂow execution oﬀers advantages for the key characteristics of
WFMSs availability and information governance due to the removal of the central
entity which is in charge for the workﬂow execution. Moreover, by applying our
concept non-repudiation can be added as a new feature to the functional library of
workﬂow based systems.
The security treatment (e.g. allow access to data or encrypt data for speciﬁc
partners etc.) in our approach is determined by security policies. Thus the selec-
tion of proper speciﬁcation of security policy rules and their systematic generation
is crucial for the fulﬁllment of the speciﬁed security requirements. Therefore the
process of generation of security policies, which will be able to ensure a proper level
of security in the common case, still needs some further research.
Automated processes between machines are increasingly required by the industry
to meet the trend towards highly ﬂexible environments. In this machine to machine
(M2M) case each entity performs actions in the mandate of the owner. Combining
the presented concept with hardware based security signature concepts, stating the
integrity of each entity, opens the way for non-repudiation in M2M processes.
Till now little eﬀort has been dedicated to veriﬁcation of the modeled business
processes. For example, there is no support to detect possible deadlocks, to detect
parts of the process that are not viable or to verify speciﬁc security requirements.
Using asynchronous product automata (APA) and the simple homomorphism ver-
iﬁcation tool (SHVT) [21,19,20], developed in the Fraunhofer SIT, we intend to
formally specify and verify the presented approach, and thus prove that the exe-
cution of such workﬂow instances is secure with respect to the identiﬁed security
requirements.
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